The Farnese dukes dominated the province of Parma, north Italy, from the period 1548 to 1731. An important characteristic of their rule was their receptiveness to petitions and supplications from their subjects. Petitions from subjects of varying social positions to absolutist rulers provide a wealth of information pertaining to the relationships between dukes or princes and the populations they ruled. This article argues that the subjects of the Farnese duchy of Parma relied on the relationships of channels of communication provided by a well-entrenched system of petitions and appeals as a way to relieve themselves of the obligation to resolve quarrels and social conflicts
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INTRODUCTION
L ate in October, 1637, one Alessandro Mariano wrote a petition to the duke o� Parma, Odoardo Farnese (1622�1646). Mariano complained that, earlier in August, he was investigated b� the Parman chie� criminal judge, the Auditore Criminale, because "he might have killed Gironimo di Pastori in the village o� Borghetto […] and because [Mariano] wishes to prove his innocence in this crime o� which [he] was impugned, he has decided to turn himsel� in." However, Mariano's petition went on to explain, "he doubts that some evil will not be ordered against him when he will be in prison." There�ore, his petition requested that " [Mariano] ma� not be interrogated �or an� other matter than �or the abovementioned homicide" 3 . What these other matters were, the petition did not sa�. However, Mariano's chie� concern was the possibilit� o� being punished �or the murder which he apparentl� did not commit, and Mariano opted to surrender to the authorities rather than risk a sentence in absentia. The duke ratified the petition, and added that Mariano would be granted a sa�e conduct on condition that he spent ten da�s in jail in Parma upon his surrender.
This article is about petitioning and violence, and their intersection in seventeenth� centur� Parma. Wh� did Mariano surrender to the authorities �or a violent crime he did not commit, and wh� was he incarcerated regardless ? What purpose did his petition serve in this case ? Here, petitioning re�ers to the process b� which subjects appealed to authorities �or assistance in resolving a wide range o� issues ; in Ital�, this constituted a s�stem o� supplications written b� notaries, working within judicial structures. Historians have done much work on petitions in the last decade, noting the abilit� o� petitions to increase the personal power o� a ruler, o�ten at the expense o� bureaucratic processes or even in prejudice to the rights o� higher authorities 4 . Petitioning in France also served to strengthen the institutions o� ro�alt� and government, i� the ro�al bod�'s presence produced a lasting e��ect o� obedience through the passage o� a ro�al tour 5 . Muchembled used French petitions explicitl� to stud� violence in Artois, and argued that while adhering to a standard o� truth and being revealing o� people's habits and customs, the� do not provide historians with 3 Archivio di Stato di Parma (herea�ter ASPR), Supremo Consiglio di Giustizia e di Grazia e Consiglio della Dettatura, Suppliche e Memoriali¸bb.43, #1166. 4 An earl�, and ver� astute, anal�sis o� the wa�s in which petitions (in this case, �or homicide pardon) served the interests o� both the ro�al authorit� and the petitioners themselves is Davis (1987) . C�. Logette (1994) ; Niccoli (1995 Niccoli ( , 2007 ; Nubola (2001) ; Nubola, Wurgler (2004) ; Nubola, Belloni (2006) ; Repetti (2000) . 5 Gauvard (1997, p. 281) . direct access to a histor� o� criminalit� 6 . Earl� modern Europeans used petitions to place their behaviour into ordinar�, or even banal, circumstances, and thus petitions reveal much about the role o� violence in social li�e in the earl� modern world.
At the same time, recent scholarship into the ducal states o� earl� modern Ital� has revealed the wa�s in which aspiring rulers meddled in the a��airs o� their magistracies, subverted their own orders, or ignored o�ficial corruption in order to pursue a more expansive supreme authorit� situated in the ducal persona 7 . Subjects and supplicants themselves were also inclined to strategic use o� court s�stems. From the medieval period, a time associated with the rationalization o� courts, citizens and residents o� cities used litigation to damage their enemies, b� staining their reputations or instigating an endless series o� judicial processes against them 8 . Earl� modern courts were thus arenas o� negotiation, between individuals, and between individuals and institutions, in which the subjects o� absolutist governments both propagated and resolved their social conflicts 9 . Europeans' use o� courts to settle conflicts expanded at the same time as historical rates o� violence declined in a long�term process 10 . Violence in this article is primaril� empirical : it re�ers to ph�sical aggression between individuals or groups with the aim o� inflicting wounds or humiliation. This could be either reciprocal or one�sided victimization. Manuel Eisner's 2003 database o� historical data on violent crime throws its empirical decline into sharp relie�, revealing that �rom England to Finland, in the Netherlands as in Switzerland and German�, rates o� interpersonal violence �ell dramaticall�, with Ital� experiencing a decline later, in the mid� nineteenth centur� 11 . Eisner's s�nthesis demonstrates the strength o� a comparative, quantitative method in this field : in order to assess properl� the behavioural changes that Europeans seemingl� underwent, a longue durée anal�sis o� statistical trends, with consideration o� source qualit� and the roles pla�ed b� specific social groups in an� findings, is necessar� to document the incidence o� violence itsel�. This was done �or the British Isles in the 1970s, but has not been done �or specific regions o� Ital� and much o� the continent 12 . However, a statistical picture o� levels o� violence can simpl� demonstrate the phenomenon, not explain it. Here, agreement among historians �alters, and explanations derive �rom two streams o� thought. The first stream �ollows Elias' theor� o� the civilizing process. Scholars in this vein argue that changes to socio� cultural �orces, notabl� concepts o� male honour, reduced the violent tendencies o� European males. The argument, simplified �or brevit�, goes as �ollows. As Europeans 6 Muchembled (1989, p. 17) 7 Chambers, Dean (1997, pp. 113�146 & 179�232) ; Terpstra (2001) ; Waquet (1992, p. 153) . These rates o� violence are usuall� expressed in homicide rates, as a measure o� violent deaths per 100,000 people. Two surve� works cover most o� the literature concerning non��atal violence as well as homicide. Eisner (2003) provides the background to an� case stud� o� non��atal violence ; Spieren� burg (2008) emphasizes the decline o� �atal violence and the trans�ormation o� notions o� "honour" among elites as the mitigating �actor most germane to the long�term decline.
11 Eisner (2003, pp. 95�99) . Eisner›s data �or Ital� are not as complete as �or other areas ; more archival work needs to be done in both North and South Italian archives be�ore firm conclusions ma� be reached.
12 Beattie (1974) ; Cockburn (1991) ; Given (1977) ; Hammer (1978) . defined male honour less b� lineage and ph�sical strength, and more so b� personal comportment, �ashion and good manners, deadl� elite violence gave wa� to st�lized duels ; the lower classes responded b� developing their own honour codes and ritualizing their own violence 13 . Historians have modified the civilizing process to pertain to violence, and have confirmed its applicabilit� to observable declines in violence 14 . The increasing criminalization o� violence b� state authorities, according to these authors, did more than just cause people to consider the costs o� their actions : Spierenburg argues that demonstrable changes in levels o� human aggression and its t�pologies are the mani�estations o� genuine changes to human emotional make�up, as a result o� which humans are not onl� less inclined to violence, but less capable o� the inclination itsel� 15 . A counter�school o� thought sees violence as a social strateg� available to all people at all times, who emplo� it among other tools, such as the law, to advance what the� see as their interests and thus give it some kind o� communicative meaning. Anton Blok takes this view in his anthropological work, noting that "people have developed strong �eelings about […] violence. The� are inclined to consider […] [it] as the antithesis o� civilization," be�ore arguing �or violence's strong communicative power 16 . For historians, this has meant a reconsideration o� the decline o� violence and its place in earl� modern societ�. Thus, Stuart Carroll argues against the civilizing process and the expansion o� the French monarch� as determining �actors in the decline o� elite violence in sixteenth�centur� France. French nobilit� retained the prerogative to use violence strategicall� to advance their own interests ; i� the� chose not to do so, it was because the� recognized better opportunities �or social and personal advancement in their local social milieus and within the ro�al house's expansion, while in �act the duel did not constitute a ritualized violence, but an amplified and more blood� violence indeed 17 . Gregor� Hanlon and Paul H�ams take views similar to Carroll's in their works on conflict in seventeenth�centur� Ital� and late�medieval England. Hanlon brings �orth the man� arenas o� minor and deadl� conflict between Tuscan villagers and illuminates the �act that "there was a variet� o� individual responses to di��erent problems" 18 . H�ams looks at attempts b� medieval English kings to extend a " king's peace" and dampen the incidence o� �eud, and finds that even i� monarch� wished to centralize, and to impose a standard o� behaviour on nobles, �euding remained a basic categor� o� social interaction �or medieval English elites 19 . Common among these cases is the idea that c�cles o� retributive violence tend to be sel��limiting, because the costs o� endless violence are not practicall� bearable 20 . This article seeks to uni�� these two views b� proposing that while earl� modern Europeans continued to consider, and to exercise, violence as a �unctional strateg� o� social competition, this �unctionalism was curbed b� the evolution o� institutional 13 Gallant (2000) ; Muir (1993, p. xxix) ; Spierenburg (1994 Spierenburg ( , 1996 Spierenburg ( , 1998 Spierenburg (2001 Spierenburg ( , 2008 Carroll (2006, p. 25) .
18 Hanlon (2007, p. 9). 19 H�ams (2003, p. 71) . 20 Carroll (2006, pp. 7�8) ; H�ams (2003, pp. 14, 34, 83, 92 & 108) . structures encouraging conflict resolution through negotiation and participation in legal s�stems 21 . People retained the propensit� �or violence in man� situations, as the� do toda�. However, processes o� centralization and absolute expansion had real e��ects on the choices made b� ordinar� people. When presented with options that o��ered non�violent solutions to conflicts, subjects tended to pursue these routes, and over time these options became first the best and then the onl� �unctional options within the bounds o� societ�. We should there�ore look �or practical explanations o� how European peoples managed the control o� violence throughout the earl� modern period. Historians need to consider how populations seized the opportunit� �or active participation in the control o� communit� violence. This stud� assesses how the process o� petitioning the ducal court constituted one such mechanism in seventeenth�centur� Parma, Ital�.
The duch� o� Parma in the seventeenth centur� is an appropriate �ocus �or such a stud� �or two reasons. First, the seventeenth centur� ma� be considered a period o� governmental stabilit� in Ital�. The absolute states that �ormed in the sixteenth centur� had, �or the most part, established themselves under firm d�nastic control b� the earl� seventeenth centur� 22 . The Farnese overcame local opposition to their rule in 1612, and reigned in an unbroken line until 1731. The� are a paradigmatic absolute d�nast�. Thus, the duch� o� Parma provides a stable background against which we ma� isolate violence and petitioning to determine their interaction. Second, seventeenth�centur� Ital� has not received the attention paid to the fi�teenth and sixteenth centuries in English scholarship, particularl� with regards to the interactions between absolute states and their populations. One goal is thus to encourage scholars to look be�ond traditional "renaissance" periodization to find continuities and disruptions between these centuries.
THE SCENE OF THE CRIME : THE JUDICIARY OF PARMA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
The duch� o� Parma was located in north�central Ital�, south o� the Po and west o� Bologna. In the seventeenth centur�, its population was approximatel� 300,000 between the cities o� Parma and Piacenza, and the outl�ing towns and settlements. The dukes re�erred to here, Odoardo I (1622�1646) and Ranuccio II (1646�1694) were ducal monarchs who received petitions �rom their subjects through a bod� known as the Council o� Sentencing (Consiglio della Dettatura) 23 . These petitions
21
For the stud� o� violence in particular, historians must not avoid con�ronting the ps�chological and behavioural influences that la� behind the expression o� culture, including violence. C�. Bla��er�Har� d�, Haus�ater (1984) ; Dal�, Wilson (1988) ; Diamond (1992, pp. 223�316) ; Pinker (2002, pp. 306� 336) . Historians working with these materials include Hanlon (2007) and H�ams (2003) . A recent is� sue o� the British Journal of Criminology (Eisner, 2011 ) is devoted to the application o� evolutionar� models to violence across a range o� topics, �rom violence in non�state societies to judicial violence in Nazi German�. Steven Pinker's monograph on the grand historical decline o� violence phrases this interaction o� individual and institutional pacification in terms o� human mental and emotive inclina� tions towards or awa� �rom violence (2011).
22
I here use « absolute » as a signifier, while recognizing that the realit� o� earl� modern monarchical states was much more fluid and dependent upon negotiation and elite goodwill. C�. Henshall, (1992) ; Collins (2009) . A recent anal�sis o� the importance o� petitions �or an emergent absolute d�nast� is Shaw (2012) .
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The roles o� the maternal regents who governed during the minorit� o� these two dukes begs investigation.
constituted an important element o� the judicial s�stem. Parmans could write petitions addressing civil and criminal issues. The� divide loosel� into six categories : Judicial (asking �or pardon �or a crime), Protection (requesting help solving private conflicts), Favour (seeking emplo�ment at the court, �or instance), Charit� (o�ten �rom widows or �oung women), Tax Reduction or Extension, and Debt Relie� or Collection. Petitions thus drew a range o� issues under the authorit� o� the Farnese judiciar�. The Farnese dukes entrusted the administration o� the Dettatura to a series o� o�ficers and Presidents, whose powers and responsibilities expanded over time as the Farnese saw opportunities to increase the reach and e�ficienc� o� government.
The Dettatura was the appeals court o� a judicial s�stem that combined central courts with a network o� councils and o�ficials that brought in�ormation and people into Parma �rom the countr�side. In the cit�, a chie� criminal judge (Uditore Criminale) relied upon a rudimentar� s�stem o� police (sbirri) to apprehend criminals, and he had independent responsibilit� �or urban cases as well as �or those �rom the man� fie�s in Farnese land. He judged �rom three criminal benches in Parma. This judge also decided cases involving �eudal, militar� and poaching laws. His membership on the Supreme Council o� Justice and Merc�, which vetted all sentences o� death, mutilation or long�term galle� service, gave him jurisdiction over the entire Farnese territor�. At the same time, the judge needed the approval o� this Supreme Council to approve his sentences o� execution, mutilation, or long�term galle� service. Investigations in the countr�side were carried out b� municipal governors (Podestà) who reported their conclusions to the Supreme Council in Parma
24
. The Dettatura �unctioned as an appeal court in this s�stem. Plainti��s and de�endants could request pardon �rom the Dettatura, while the criminal judge and his counterpart, the civil judge, could each request a decision, taken b� vote, �rom the council's members 25 . The Dettatura's decisions were confirmed b� the President o� the Supreme Council, who was also a member o� the Council o� Sentencing. The membership o� the Dettatura included the presidents o� the Fiscal Camera, which governed tax and budgetar� matters, and the Congregation o� the Communes, which governed the widespread operations o� rural village councils 26 . Thus, the Dettatura brought a range o� competencies under one jurisdiction, and this e�ficient centralization o� the appeals process is characteristic o� the relativel� simple judiciar� o� the Farnese state.
Two ke� elements o� the Farnese judiciar� provide the "o�ficial" view o� the petitioning process. These are the magistrac� responsible �or the s�stem's operation (Consiglio della Dettatura), and a book o� prescriptions (the Rituale) that regulated the �ees and other administrative business arising �rom petitioning. The Consiglio della Dettatura was one o� the most power�ul bodies in the administration o� the Parman state throughout the seventeenth centur� and until the end o� the Farnese d�nast� in 1731
27
. It possessed ultimate jurisdiction over most criminal and civil
The involvement o� the duchess Dorotea in eighteenth�centur� petitions ma� hint that the� too received, adjudicated and declared on the petitions o� regular subjects. Without a bod� o� petitions addressed to either o� them, likel� conserved in the Archivio di Stato di Parma, a thorough anal�sis o� their priorities and those o� their petitioners is precluded, but this is certainl� an area o� research worth pursuing.
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Di Noto (1980, pp. 91�105).
25
Di Noto (1980, p. 75) .
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Ibid.
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The council was originall� established b� Ranuccio I in 1594. At that time, it possessed jurisdiction over both the major cities o� the Farnese State. Con�usion and ine�ficiencies, as well as accusations matters, arbitrating disputes and determining penalties �or crimes. The dukes o� Parma �ound in this council a means o� entr� into the dail� a��airs o� subjects. Its role as such helped to e��ect a shi�t that would see the population turn first to the courts and the state �or assistance in solving conflicts, be�ore violence overcame them 28 . However, the dukes imposed limits on the abilit� o� the Dettatura to act on its own authorit�. The council had the right to decide whether to grant or to reject a petition, but it had to dra�t the response (rescritto) according to certain rules laid out in the Rituale, a book compiled with the duke's approval 29 . This book regulated the taxes on criminal petitions (suppliche), ascribing certain �ees �or a pardon �or crimes depending on their severit� and the likelihood o� the petition being granted. Thus, although given a certain amount o� responsibilit�, the Dettatura was nevertheless alwa�s under the thumb o� the dukes.
The rules o� that ducal thumb were �ound in the Rituale noted above, which exhaustivel� lists the gamut o� appealable issues -specificall� pardonable crimesand the fines that attended a petition. The Rituale lists the prescribed �ees �or supplications in a section entitled 'Regulae Generales Dictaturae'. The preamble continues with some basic guidelines �or supplication. For instance, no homicide committed in anger could be supplicated without a three��ear interval and the prior concession o� a pax �rom the victim's �amil�, thus encouraging the killer to make his primar� amends with the victims 30 . This requirement has medieval antecedents based on the notion that homicide was primaril� an o��ense against a victim's kin, and secondaril� against the king's law. In medieval England, the king's attempts to act against homicide were thwarted b� the determination o� the nobilit� to demand their own satis�action and peace�making processes 31 . B� the earl� modern period, however, Italian governments �reel� prosecuted homicides using inquisitorial process, so no complaint �rom �amil� was required to initiate an investigation. The requirement �or a peace accord in Parma is thus a �unctional continuit� reflecting structural change. While prosecuting homicides as crimes, the Farnese also allowed the victims' �amilies a modicum o� input. This not onl� legitimized the duke's pardon, b� ensuring its acceptance among the victims o� crime, but also ensured that potential retributive violence was �oresworn b� those likel� to take vengeance. The manual also dictates a general rule �or the taxation o� supplications, that the o� localism and �avouritism, soon led the duke to withdraw the Dettatura to Parma while instituting a separate Ducal Council in Piacenza. It originall� oversaw the arbitration o� civil disputes submitted b� subjects, but when its e�ficienc� and use�ulness were made clear to Ranuccio, he expanded its jurisdiction to include civil and criminal cases, as well as those emanating �rom the �eudal territories o� Busseto and the upper Taro valle�. The five�man council thus received petitions �rom Farnese subjects until 1731. These petitions, or a great deal o� them, are conserved in the Archivio di Stato di Parma, in the collection o� Consiglio della Dettatura, Suppliche e Memoriali.
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Other programs were aimed at noble pacification as described b� Angelozzi (2003) ; Di Simplicio (1994) . 29 Biblioteca Palatina di Parma (herea�ter BP), MS Parmeggiane, Miscellanea Farnesiana, #554. This document was written anon�mousl� in 1596, shortl� a�ter the council was instituted b� Ranuccio I. It s�stematicall� defines the duties o� much o� the Farnese judiciar� while also tabulating the penalties a�fixed to the punishment o� delicts, and establishes the terms o� pardon in Parma. 30 BP, MS Parmeggiane, Miscellanea Farnesiana, #554, p. 3. The granting o� a peace accord �rom the victim's kin to the sla�er was a common requirement o� pardons �or homicide across the continent. Hurnard (1969) ; Davis (1987) ; Smail (2003) . �ee �or a granted petition be set at 1/5 the potential judicial fine �or the pardoned crime 32 . Finall�, be�ore listing the prescribed �ees, the guide describes how to cra�t a rescritto, the di��erent t�pes o� which are examined in Paola Repetti's anal�sis o� the cra�ting o� Parman suppliche 33 . The Rituale amounted to a �ormalization o� the means o� petitioning : i� the� wished to access ducal merc�, Parmans were required to �ollow a defined series o� legal actions, beginning with the dra�ting o� a petition, that emphasized the unequal power relationships between ruler and ruled. Moreover, the Council's development over time allowed the Farnese to continue drawing private dispute settlement into the legal �ramework o� the state. This association o� private and public justice a��orded the dukes a concrete identification with the social problems and needs o� their subjects, while at the same time paci��ing the behavioural responses o� Parmans to threatening situations.
Regardless o� their input into the s�stem, Farnese dukes did not review or involve themselves in the majorit� o� their subjects' petitions. The� were content �or most petitions to be treated on a da��to�da� basis b� their high magistrates. However, the� promulgated decrees (gride) that modified the terms and �unction o� the Dettatura, and these decrees are indicative o� the attitudes with which the� viewed petitioning and its relationship to their authorit�. The success and �ailure rates o� ordinar� petitions, and those petitions that bore ducal scrutin�, show how petitions encouraged subjects to work within the Farnese judiciar�. This s�stem allowed Parmans to express their social needs while at the same time constraining their behaviour, or the behaviour o� their social adversaries.
Like the Tudor monarchs o� England, Farnese dukes publicised special decrees o� general pardon, called decreti gratiosi, which celebrated a momentous occasion in the d�nastic household such as a ro�al birth or the ascendanc� o� a new duke 34 . In 1628, Odoardo declared one such decree to celebrate his marriage to Margherita de'Medici, the daughter o� Cosimo II 35 . Margherita's signature on the decree was her �ormal entr� into the role o� Duchess (Duchessa), and the general pardon that accompanied the ducal marriage was an attempt to a�filiate the subject population, and its wel�are, with the Farnese d�nast� and its �uture as represented b� the �oung duke and his new bride. A new general pardon was decreed in 1629 to celebrate the Duchess' pregnanc� with Odoardo's son Ranuccio, the �uture Ranuccio II ; this decree was extended and renewed repeatedl� 36 . The last renewal came in Februar� 1631 and noted specificall� the duke's awareness that his previous decrees had not served "those who are �ar awa�, or trul� �or diverse reasons have been prevented �rom being able to enjo� the benefits o� the said decree" 37 . To remed� this, the decree commanded senior o�ficials in Parma, Piacenza, Borgo san Donnino and the Congregation o� the Communes (Congregazione sopra Comuni) to publicize the month�long extension as widel� as possible to ensure that all subjects had e��ective access to the general pardon. d�nast� were accompanied b� ro�al grace to cement their subjects' identification o� well�being with the stabilit� o� the Farnese.
The dukes also used irregular decrees to trans�orm judicial o�fices. In a 1661 decree addressed to both the o�ficers and notaries o� the Dettatura, Duke Ranuccio II laid out the grounds on which his councillors would best �ulfil his "personal patronage no less than [their] public service"
38
. This decree was a comprehensive rendering o� the necessar� securit� o� the Dettatura's ph�sical o�fices and o� the document archive it governed. The o�fices had two ke�s, kept b� the chancellor and vice�chancellor. Onl� the chancellor or vice�chancellor were authorised to write and sign rescritti in the name o� the duke, and i� supplicants requested copies, the� were required to do so o� the Dettatura's sta�� notaries and the cop� itsel� had to be made within the Dettatura's o�fices. The decree ordered that originals o� all supplications be kept under lock and ke�. Responsibilit� �or the maintenance o� securit� and the inviolabilit� o� the Dettatura's ph�sical edifice, and hence their political and moral authorit�, was given to the two chancellors alread� tasked with responding to supplicants. In this wa�, the duke drew a direct line o� authorit� �rom himsel�, through the chancellor and vice�chancellor, to those subjects who abased themselves at the �eet o� his magistrates and begged his assistance in their social conflicts.
The decline in violence, the growth o� ducal authorit� in the princel� states o� the Italian peninsula, and the �ormalisation and regulation o� the means �or subjects to appeal to and petition the state authorities are intimatel� related. As Italian states cr�stallised in the seventeenth centur�, s�stems o� petitioning became more expansive, encompassing a broader range o� issues �rom criminal pardon to social assistance and tax relie� 39 . Like their counterparts in other major and minor cities, the Farnese consistentl� prescribed harsh penalties and mediated their application in practice. Additionall�, a�ter a brie� spike in numbers in 1636, capital punishment in Parma declined to a level averaging about one a �ear b� 1700, and one ever� three �ears therea�ter 40 .
No longer inclined to demonstrate their power through the public gallows, the Farnese exploited the potential o� suppliche. The Farnese income �rom petitions constituted approximatel� one percent o� annual revenue in the late seventeenth centur�, and cannot be considered a significant wind�all. The Farnese dukes instead recognised that petitioning could help to stabilise a population that was increasingl� dependent upon the abilit� o� a single d�nastic house to maintain order in the cities and villages o� the state. As a reliable means to solve problems without the risks o� violence, petitioning drew Farnese subjects awa� �rom private justice and into the expanding judiciar�. series o� administrative materials and correspondence reveal the 'o�ficial' workings o� the Council, and how the Farnese dukes involved themselves personall� in the appeals b� subjects and influenced the decisions o� senior magistrates. Those cases in which the dukes, particularl� Ranuccio II, took a personal interest illuminate clearl� the configuration o� princel� politics that is also visible in the workings o� the Medici regime. The combination o� judicial correspondence and petitions allows �or a qualitative assessment o� the wa�s in which petitioning constituted a reciprocal process. As Table 1 demonstrates, the petitions �rom the earl� seventeenth centur� re�er primaril� to criminal matters, with a scattering o� civil misdemeanours and financial issues throughout the bundles. This is partl� due to the impact o� the Thirt� Years War, as well as the lasting trauma o� recurrent plague c�cles. Thus, in both 1631 and 1637, petitions requesting judicial pardon accounted �or close to 50 percent o� petitions (78/156 and 198/403 respectivel�), indicating that subjects, particularl� the soldiers who were numerous in the cit� in this decade, tended to shoot or rob first, and ask �or pardon later. Petitions �rom later in the centur� were more varied in subject matter, and those which concerned violent criminalit� are much reduced b� 1687�1689, when the� accounted �or less than 25 percent (96/456) o� the serie's total. Thus, a decline in the proportion o� petitions presented to the duke requesting reprieve �rom the penalties o� crime and violence ma� indicate two things. The first is that interpersonal violence in Parma declined over the period. This article cannot prove this decline statisticall� ; however, it is in line with much o� the evidence �or a European decline in violence. The second is that violent resolution o� interpersonal There are approximatel� 250 bundles o� petitions dating �rom the mid�sixteenth until the nineteenth centur� (the Supremo Consiglio remained in operation until 1815, first under Spanish rule and then under and a�ter Napoleon). M� selection o� bundles was essentiall� random. M� goals were to es� tablish a representative chronolog� o� Farnese subjects over the seventeenth centur�, and to view these subjects within di��erent contexts, such as plague recover�. The one non�random selection was the bundle �rom 1637, which was chosen specificall� because it �ollowed a humiliating 1636 militar� campaign launched b� Odoardo Farnese. The chance to read a high volume o� soldiers' and militiamen's petitions pushed me to select this �ear specificall�.
PETITIONS, VIOLENCE AND PERSONAL RULE
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CR= criminal reprieve ; P = protection ; F= Favour ; C= Charit� ; TR= Tax Relie� ; DR= Debt Relie�. The selections o� bundles was essentiall� random, with the exception o� 1637, chosen �or its proxim� it� to the Battle o� Tornavento in 1636. Source : ASPR, Supremo Consiglio di Giustizia e di Grazia e Consiglio della Dettatura, Suppliche e memoriali, Bb 40, 43, 45, 5, 60, 65. conflicts gave wa� to appeal to judicial �orces, and the growing number o� petitions requesting ducal protection �rom enemies supports this notion. These t�pes o� petitions accounted �or 1.2 percent o� petitions in 1631 (2/156), more than 10 percent in 1659 (8/60) and 7 percent in 1727 (21/276).
However, this program o� intensel� personalised power relied �undamentall� on the active participation o� both the dukes and their subjects in the s�stem o� petitioning. Parman citizens knew the s�stem, and used it well. The Farnese judiciar� operated under the inquisitorial s�stem, and subjects progressed through it as �ollows : The complaint o� a plainti�� was not required to initiate procedure. Upon the report o� a crime, either b� denunciation or because it was discovered some other wa�, a police �orce (sbirri) attempted to apprehend the criminal. I� the� were success�ul, the suspect �aced inquisitorial trial behind closed doors b� the Uditore Criminale or one o� his assistant judges, and was subjected to torture in order to ensure �ull and truth�ul disclosure 43 . Once interrogation was complete, the judge compiled reports o� questions and answers, and provided this evidence to the de�ence, who then had the opportunit� to review it with the accused. The de�ence then compiled his own report and gave it to the judge, who pronounced sentence. This concluded the initial phase o� the judicial process. The Dettatura could become involved in two wa�s. First, the judge himsel� could request input �rom the Dettatura into his decision, and the council would vote on the issue and return their answer 44 . This was done in cases where the outcome was unclear, in cases o� disputes where the parties were o� su�ficientl� high status to challenge the decision b� a single judge, or where the judge �elt that the additional input o� the Dettatura would give the sentence more gravit�, especiall� in capital cases where ordinar� judges did not have the competenc� to declare a death sentence unilaterall�. Alternativel�, i� the de�endant was declared guilt� and sentenced, he or she could appeal the sentence directl� to the council, b� having a notar� dra�t a petition to the council that outlined the reasons wh� the de�endant believed him� or hersel� worth� o� pardon. I� convinced, the judges o� the council dra�ted the rescritto according to the established rules.
The �amiliarit� o� subjects with the necessar� �ormulae �or success�ul petitions indicates that appealing to the Dettatura was a regular aspect o� the earl� modern Parmans' dail� encounter with state authorit�. The broad range o� issues the� petitioned and the prominence o� particular social groups, such as militiamen, show that Parmans strategised their petitions and ma� have re�rained �rom submitting a supplica until the� considered their chances o� success to be most �avourable. Further, certain petitions provide ver� suggestive evidence �or an active turn b� Parman subjects to state authorit� in avoidance o� personal conflict and violence. The wa�s in which the Farnese dukes, particularl� Ranuccio II, treated these exceptional petitions illustrate the conception o� princel� rule that motivated their inter�erence with the judicial s�stem, and link the pacified behaviour o� Parman subjects to the strengthening o� the personal ruler through visible and �unctional communicative mechanisms.
A sample will make clear the material anal�sis o� petitions below. The �ollowing is the petition o� Antonia Mussona, who in 1644 was brought in �ront o� the Criminal Judges (Auditori Criminali) �or her involvement in a quarrel with unknown enemies. She addressed hersel� to the Dettatura as below : 43 On the inquisitorial s�stem o� continental Europe generall�, see Spierenburg (1984, pp. 8�9) . 44 Di Noto (1980, p. 71).
Antonia Mussona, humble servant and petitioner o� �our Supreme Illustrious Magistrates, reminds �ou how she has been molested b� the Criminal O�fice o� Parma that wants to punish her �or a fight, and make one o� her sons pa� her fine. But the petitioner being poor, having nothing else �rom which to live, because her husband consumed all she had and not having an� more, it was necessar� to go into service to support hersel�, this wa� being deprived o� two daughters, the� having gone to the service o� the Serene Prince in Candia. Now the poor petitioner genuflects at the �eet o� �our Supreme Illustrious Magistrates, humbl� supplicating that the� would consider giving her grace b� ordering that the petitioner should no longer be molested �or this quarrel, and also that whatever there is about her in the criminal books be overturned, �or all this the petitioner hopes to obtain �rom �our Supreme Illustrious Magistrates. Quam Deus 45 .
The communicative strategies emplo�ed b� Parmans in their petitions are a good starting point to illustrate the active engagement o� Farnese subjects in the program o� suppliche e rescritti. Petitions all begin with obsequious praise �or the benignit� o� the duke or his o�ficers. This honorific address, clearl� stipulated b� notarial prudence, took a variet� o� �orms that stressed those ducal qualities that petitioners wished to invoke. Thus, some petitions stress the "most serene" nature o� the duke, while others emphasise his ro�al highness, and others still �ocus on his "immense clemenc� and goodness" (immensa clemenza e benignità). The notar� likel� chose the most fitting obsequ� �or the petitioner's tale, and then copied the stor� into the petition. This technique served to establish the abject position o� the petitioner, kneeling in tears at the duke's �eet �or merc�. The �amiliarit� o� subjects with these requirements indicates an almost scripted regularit� to Parman petitions, whose literar� �orm is remarkabl� consistent across the bundles examined here 46 . Parmans identified themselves as "humble and devoted servants" o� the duke while at the same time submitting repeated supplications designed to steadil� decrease their taxes owed to the crown 47 . Indeed, petitioners understood well the benefit o� repeated supplication, and strategised their petitions to address first the legal issue the� �aced, and secondaril�, to evade the �ees on petitions themselves. Criminal petitions, particularl�, took a t�pical �orm. The petitioner, who committed crime x, petitioned the Dettatura �or the �ree grace and remission o� 45 « L'Antonia Mussona humil.ma serva et oratrice delle ss.ie VVMme gli espone qualmente viene molestat dal o�ficio criminale di Parma col volerla pignorare per una querella, qual pretendono che paghi un suo figliolo, e essendo l'oratrice povera, non havendo cosa alcuna con che vivere, havendosi il marito consumato quanto haveva et non havendo con che vivere, è stata necesitata andare a servire per sostentarsi, come anco essendo priva di due figlioli, essendo andati al servicio del Ser.mo Pincipe in Candia. Hora la povera oratrice genuflesa a piedi delle Ssrie VVMme quelle humil.te supplicando degnarsi �argli gracia di ordinare, che l'oratrice non sia gravata ne molestata per tal causa, et anche sia cassato detta que ne Da come anco altre se ve ne �osse dalle libri Criminali, che tanto l'oratrice spera ottenere dalli Ssrie VVMme Quam Deus. » ASP, Supremo Consiglio di Giustizia e di Grazia e Consiglio della Dettatura, Suppliche e Memoriali, bb. 45. 46 This is much in line with Davis' anal�sis o� petitions, in which particular �eatures o� a pardon letter were seen as stock elements indicating the required states o� mind, regret and a lack o� premedita� tion, but contrar� to Muchembled's stud� o� pardon letters �rom Artois. Muchembled instead empha� sises the mundane aspects o� pardon letters, which, he argues, place the misdeeds o� French nobilit� against a background o� ever�da� ordinariness in order to deemphasise their behavioural transgres� sions. Davis (1987) ; Muchembled (1992) . 47 Margarita Spadania, �or instance, submitted two petitions in 1631, progressivel� lowering the fine she owed �or what appears to be a public decenc� in�raction. ASPR, Supremo Consiglio di Giustizia e di Grazia e Consiglio della Dettatura, Suppliche e Memoriali, bb.40, #905 & #1132. guilt (ogni gratia e libero dono). These petitions seem overl� ambitious, �or the magistrates were unlikel� to grant such a request �or even minor delicts. Common procedure was thus to grant a pardon with certain conditions attached. Giose��o di Costa, called Fallopieno, received one such pardon in 1637 �or insolence to a public o�ficial 48 . Attendant to his pardon was a fine o� six gold scudi, which di Costa had no intention o� pa�ing. He promptl� submitted a second petition that emphasised his povert� and previous service in the ducal militia to justi�� his request to have the fine eliminated, or reduced significantl�. Petitioners such as di Costa were prepared to invest a considerable amount o� time and e��ort into pursuing their needs through the Dettatura, even recognising long�term strategies that would reduce the burden o� the legal s�stem on their finances and social capital.
The subjects o� the Farnese were �amiliar with the option o� presenting a case to a supreme governmental bod�, and recognised the benefits the� could gain b� taking this option. Two series o� petitions will demonstrate how this relates to the decline o� violence. The first concerns petitions that �ocus on violent crime, or crime�related violence, committed b� the petitioner : simple assaults, robberies, brawls and fights that involve weapons. Significantl�, this series shows that over the centur� Parmans, particularl� soldiers, developed a pre�erence �or firearms displa�, rather than ritualistic kni�e fighting as seen elsewhere in Europe. The second series contains petitions that precluded acts o� violence, and requested protection �rom the petitioner's rivals or enemies. Parmans now emplo�ed the legal s�stem to their advantage. As noted b� the Rituale, the fine �or a fight in which blood was spilled, �or instance b� a skil�ul kni�e� fighter's attack on his opponent's cheek, was significantl� higher than unlicensed possession or displa� o� a firearm. Thus, in their dail� conflicts, Parmans ma� have considered the costs and benefits o� potential violence, specificall� their abilit� to avoid significant punishment b� appealing to the Dettatura, and chosen more s�mbolic means o� displa�ing and acting out status competitions and other disputes in the earl� modern cit�.
In 1636, Duke Odoardo led a Parman arm� to counter the threat o� a Spanish invasion o� Piacenza 49 . The high numbers o� soldiers and militiamen present in the Duch� around the time o� Duke Odoardo's experiment with militar� glor� overloaded the records in 1637 with petitions �rom quarrelsome soldiers. Their petitions show how these men interacted with each other and with the local citizenr�. Due to their training, soldiers t�picall� were more inured to interpersonal violence than shopkeepers ; these petitions, there�ore, are not representative o� the violent behaviour o� all Parman subjects, but nevertheless displa� the care�ul attitude taken towards illicit violence b� soldiers 50 . O� course, these men went too �ar on occasion. There are fi�teen extant petitions �or homicide in this entire series o� petitions, �ourteen o� which date �rom the �ears 1631 and 1637, and all these cases involved soldiers either as aggressors or victims, and �requentl� both. In these instances, the 48 ASPR, Supremo Consiglio di Giustizia e di Grazia e Consiglio della Dettatura, Supplica e Memoriali bb 43, supplica o� Giosetto di Costa, #849.
49 Parrott (2001, p. 118) . While the siege was broken b� the aid o� a French arm� which initiated battle with the Spanish at Tornavento on 22 June 1636, Odoardo was le�t in an untenable political position a�ter the French �ailed to consolidate their victor� and solidi�� control o� the area around Milan. Odoardo made peace with the Spanish in earl� 1637.
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On the ps�cholog� o� soldiers and the training required to inculcate the capacit� �or violence, see the work on drill and repetition in Grossman (1995) .
Dettatura re�used to reintegrate violent o��enders into the legal strictures o� the state ; soldiers who did not resort to �atal violence could expect a much more �avourable treatment b� the judges.
Soldiers seem activel� to have avoided homicidal violence, in order to decrease the di�ficult� o� an� potential encounter with the judicial apparatus. That said, the� calculated displa�s o� status and strength that minimized the danger o� a judicial burden. The least risk� displa� strateg� was the public flaunting o� a weapon in areas associated with authorit�, sanctit� or sa�et� 51 . Churches fit the bill. On 12 September 1637, Giovanni Domenico Scacalea petitioned the Dettatura to review his sentence �or carr�ing his schioppo, a t�pe o� earl� shotgun, to church in his native village o� Torchiana, and to eliminate the fine entirel�, based on the record o� his militia service to Odoardo 52 . In what must have been a shock to the petitioner given the relativel� minor o��ence, his fine o� �our gold scudi was confirmed b� the Dettatura, who rejected his petition outright. In contrast, Cesare Stachi's petition appealing the outstanding �unds o� the twelve scudi, that he was fined �or twice bringing his gun to church and once pointing it at an adversar� during a quarrel, was granted on the basis that he had alread� paid a �air portion o� the balance 53 . The di��erence accorded to these two petitions indicates that the duke was not wont to give �ree absolution to misbehaving soldiers ; rather, the bonds o� �ealt� and submission created b� the pa�ment o� even a small amount o� mone� allowed �or the advancement o� mutual interests. The petitioner avoided more serious punishment and was still able to threaten and intimidate, while the duke drew power to himsel� b� deciding the �ate o� even minor miscreants.
Churches were not the onl� public places where soldiers committed this t�pe o� firearms in�raction. Local �estival celebrations were another excellent field on which to demonstrate virilit� in a public setting without the need to engage in actual violence against an adversar� in order to prove dominance. Thus, Diminio Pintio, a musketeer in the ducal militia, was condemned to the regular �our gold scudi fine �or bringing his loaded weapon to a dance. His petition was rejected because he also pointed the weapon at an o�ficial o� the local church 54 . The ducal court was also a firearms��ree zone. The soldier Giovanni Antonio Gonzi brought his loaded weapon to the court in December 1637 and was assessed a low fine o� one scudo, which was repealed subsequentl� b� libero dono 55 . All o� these were public areas in which soldiers could take advantage o� the judicial structure provided b� the regime to displa� their status in competition with social rivals. The� were also places with strict regulations prohibiting public violence. The willingness o� soldiers to replace ph�sical violence with aggressive posturing in the public space defined b� authorit� indicates the e��ectiveness o� s�stems o� petitioning in communicating the goals and 51 Hanlon (1985, pp. 244�268) . Hanlon notes similar behaviours among Aquitainians, who were more likel� to brandish a firearm than to fire it when considering the costs o� their action. Dettatura, Suppliche e Memoriali, bb43, #860. 53 Ibid., #1017. Dettatura, Suppliche e Memoriali, bb40, #1039. 55 Ibid., bb43, #626.
ASPR, Supremo Consiglio di Giustizia e di Grazia e Consiglio della
ambitions o� both subjects and the regime, helping to drive an� behavioural changes that seventeenth�centur� Parmans ma� have undergone.
Gun in�ractions were not limited to soldiers. On 12 Jul� 1631, Giacinto Bigolli submitted a petition to have the pa�ment on his judicial fine o� �our gold scudi dela�ed and broken into instalments 56 . Giacinto was guilt� o� the public displa� o� his schioppo at the church in Colorno. His petition received the brie� rescritto characteristic o� petitions arising �rom minor in�ractions o� no terrible concern to the duke or his magistrates : a brie� a�firmation o� the grace given. However, most firearms in�ractions were committed b� soldiers.
Farnese soldiers and subjects also developed a much more vivid �orm o� postural violence as the� moved awa� �rom the ph�sical resolution o� social conflict to more restrained social relations. As mentioned above, the judicial fines �or both the crime and the pardon were increased significantl� when a culprit drew blood �rom his adversar� or his victim. Parmans thus adapted a �orm o� non�lethal displa� violence that required no ph�sical mark like a scar on a cheek to demonstrate the victor's superior status. Numerous petitioners related how, when threatened b� adversaries, or desiring to threaten adversaries in turn, the� produced their weapon, either �rom a carr�ing "holster" or �rom its storage in their house, and began to load it in �ront o� the man or woman the� wished to intimidate and dominate. Thus, Nicolo Orti, a town o�ficial �rom Lizzano di Belvedere, belatedl� reported in 1631 that Pietro Ru�aldi and two others �rom Campia di Langhirano "loaded an archebus in �ront o� Lorenzo del Casino, o� the said town o� Campia" 57 . Orti's petition in �act asked �or �orgiveness �or neglecting to denounce this in�raction.
This case has two particularl� tantalizing aspects which throw the motivations o� both criminals and authorities into clear relie�. First loading a gun was an in�raction warranting a denunciation b� a public o�ficial in an outl�ing town to a central authorit�. The importance o� interaction between centre and peripher� towns in contexts o� strong government is clear, as historians have noted in colonial contexts but equall� germane to the discussion here 58 . Previousl�, central control o� local governance in outl�ing towns was haphazard and hampered b� s�stemic and structural di�ficulties 59 . B� the seventeenth centur�, however, the Farnese dukes were demanding -and en�orcing -involvement in the most minor conflicts in rural villages, regardless o� �eudal borders. Clearl�, the Farnese dukes were not interested solel� in social conflicts that �eatured ph�sical violence. Rather, the judicial apparatus o� the Farnese state encouraged o�ficials to involve themselves activel� in their villages' social �abric and quell tensions be�ore or as the� arose, re�erring all cases o� potential violence to the central courts.
Secondl�, the three male�actors noted in Orti's petition apparentl� had no intention o� carr�ing their threat �urther at the time. Loading an archebus in �ront o� his enem� was Pietro Ru�aldi's particularl� illustrative technique to demonstrate his superior male status. This was a ver� e��ective means to communicate hostilit�, because the cost, in terms o� investment and involvement in a legal process, was relativel� low compared to both the cost o� ph�sical violence and the benefit o� 56 Ibid., bb40, #1086.
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Ibid., unnumbered petition o� Nicolo Orti.
58 Burke (1998) ; Hanks (2010, Ch.1�3) . 59 Connell, Zorzi (2000, pp. 165�183 & 207�224). restraint. O� course, had Pietro fired the gun, either injuring or killing Lorenzo, he ma� not have escaped incarceration, exile or galle� service. In addition, he would have lost the social capital associated with status and dominance in rural areas. Local towns too were thoroughl� hierarchical, and villagers were well aware o� the relationships and status o� man� o� their covivants 60 . The simple solution was to load, but not fire, the weapon, thus counteracting both these costs o� violence. As we have seen, the local o�ficial, Nicolo Orti, did not even bother to report this in�raction to the central authorities, at least not in a timel� manner. When he did report it and was punished �or tardiness, his fine was promptl� rescinded b� the Dettatura. There are no �urther instructions to Orti �or prosecuting the case. Thus, the legal cost o� non�violent status displa� was e��ectivel� nil, compared to a steep judicial fine or the prospect o� hard labour in the galle�s and mines. B� restraining personal violence in status displa�s and choosing non�violent aggression, Farnese subjects could avoid the judiciar� entirel�, or �ace a significantl� reduced punishment �or firearms in�ractions that the Dettatura, in all likelihood, would review �avourabl�.
The �ears when soldiers were concentrated in the cit� and petitioned in unusuall� high numbers also provide the most reliable data on the success or �ailure o� these petitions. For 1631, 1637 and 1687�1689, the bundles contain petitions that have the rescritto written directl� on the document ; in other �ears, common practice was to attach a small writ with a blot o� wax, and these have not survived 61 . In 1631, o� 83 total petitions included in the bundles, 62 received an a�firmative rescritto while 21 did not, �or a success rate o� 74.6 percent. In 1637, the success rate is lower, at 61.1 percent (129/211), which could be related to the a�termath o� Odoardo's 1636 campaign and the need to recuperate �unds and restore order. Fi�t� �ears later, the picture is remarkabl� similar to that in 1631. In 1687�1689, o� 456 petitions submitted, 346 were granted, �or a success rate o� 75.9 percent, practicall� indistinguishable �rom the 1631 rate. What these numbers tentativel� indicate is the regularit� with which ducal grace was dispensed, and the calculated use o� merc� to promote the ducal persona without denigrating his authorit� and the judicial �orce that backed it.
The above petitions all concerned acts o� violence committed b� the petitioner, one o� the two broad categories that concerned violence, and which attracted the personal attention o� the duke. Broadl� speaking, Farnese dukes, in particular Ranuccio II and his son Francesco (1694�1727), took an active interest in petitions that bore on their authorit� in relation to other regional princes and in those that potentiall� threatened the paternal relationship between themselves and their subjects. The latter categor� is most interesting, �or it demonstrates how the Farnese regime provided �or Parmans an alternative to violence. Subjects themselves responded to the opportunit� �or governmental intervention b� re�erring conflicts with violent potential, or those with violent beginnings, to the duke and his ministers. This second categor� o� petitions, concerning acts or threats o� violence committed b� the petitioner's rivals, also received the duke's personal attention.
Attached to letters between the duke, his councillors and his judges, the petitions o� ordinar� Farnese subjects expressed their �ear o� the violence, retaliator� or 60 Astarita (1999) ; Hanlon (2007) ; Smail (2003) . 61 ASPR, Supremo consiglio di giustizia e consiglio della dettatura, suppliche e memoriali, bb. 40, 43, 60. provocative, o� their cohabitants in the cit� or outl�ing towns. In 1675 one o� these vividl� rela�ed the instabilit� caused b� the violence o� roving men in the countr�side. An unidentified cleric o� Castellazzo begged the duke to provide his town with "some provisions that I think are necessar�, so that in this and other states, no one will sa� that Your Highness does not commend himsel� highl� to God, and to His honour" 62 . This petition �ollowed a horrific raid carried out b� "twelve or more armed men, to assassinate m� household" and to "rob the women o� their honour." In what seems at first an unrelated aside, the anon�mous cleric emphasized the relationship upon which he based this request, a particularl� interesting �ormulation �rom a churchman : the duke knew well the troubles o� the church o� Castellazzo (flooded, the cleric noted incidentall�), where the petitioner "assisted �or 35 and more �ears," and which was now about to collapse. The local bishop re�used to �orti�� either the church or the town, and so the petitioner appealed to the duke �or aid in protecting his household, because the duke did not have " [his] hand in an�bod�'s purse." The petition requested town walls and guards to protect the church, such that Hol� Mass could proceed without the �ear o� raid and rape on the town. Although the duke's response to this petition is not indicated, the present issues o� authorit�, personalit� and protection make clear the �unction o� petitioning in the context o� violence : tools such as petitions enabled a population to turn to the ducal government �or aid rather than pursue a private vendetta or live in perpetual �ear. Conversel�, the petitioners emphasized the grand authorit� o� the duke, drawn directl� �rom God and more use�ul, even to clerg�, than the ecclesiastical hierarch� in securing the ph�sical sa�et� o� Farnese subjects.
The most lucid evidence �or this anal�sis emerges directl� �rom the words o� petitioners and dukes. Did the� see themselves as shi�ting awa� �rom a s�stem o� private violence to one in which subjects' interests were best served b� princel� authorit� ? Did Parman subjects no longer view their immediate kin networks as the first instance o� sa�et�, protection and legitimate quarrel and violence ? A petition �rom one Barbara Galli, dated 1705, indicates her discom�ort and �ear at the prospect o� her male relatives engaging in a kin war 63 . The �eud began, in �act, between Barbara and her enem�, Giulia Zanelli, "a woman o� much in�erior condition to that o� the petitioner," who "solel� out o� ill will �omented b� her husband" harassed and "man� times assaulted the honour o� [Barbara] , all o� which also threatened her ver� li�e." Out o� a desire to maintain "her proper decorum" Barbara "never wanted to cause the slightest injur� […] in all wa�s preventing this undertaking in which her husband and relatives will become involved," and had in �act moved her �amil� to another part o� the cit�, "principall� to be remedied o� an� vendetta." This Parman subject demonstrates precisel� the phenomenon under anal�sis here : b� the eighteenth centur�, Parmans activel� rejected private violence and emplo�ed the machiner� o� the state to prevent the outbreak o� vendetta. Barbara appealed to the duke to "order �our Uditore Criminale […] The idea that this ma� re�er to an earl� modern « restraining order » is tantalising but unverifiable.
the� would give up their use o� violence, Parmans needed an e��ective alternative to protect their interests and sa�et�.
Petitions provided an unrivalled opportunit� �or the Farnese princes to assume non�violent authorit� over the widel� dispersed, traditionall� �eudal, villages and hamlets that comprised much o� their territor�. In Parma, this was surel� aided b� the relativel� small size o� the Duch� and its population, and the model presented here likel� applies best to small�scale states such as those o� northern Ital� where such communication could �unction e�ficientl�. The Farnese dukes did not hesitate to meddle in the business o� their magistracies, and the� consistentl� drew the power o� the Dettatura closer to their individual purview. In constructing this magistrac�, the Farnese dukes ensured that requests �or merc� were directed immediatel� to the top o� the hierarch�. This personal identification o� merc� with ducal persona was both patriarchal, creating a metaphorical kin network in which subjects could appeal to their padrone to intervene in their disputes, and �unctional, allowing �or a consistent presence o� higher authorit� in the interactions between government and subject. At the same time, subjects' submission to this authorit� was not the product o� that authorit� in and o� itsel� ; rather, subjects responded to the opportunit� �or ducal intervention in their quarrels, making an� 'civilizing process' in Parma ver� much a cooperative a��air between subjects and ruler.
The use o� petitioning in such a light can also be brought to bear on the important historiographical issue o� social control. Tomás Mantecón and Gerd Schwerho��, dealing specificall� with neighbourhood conflict and violence, make clear that communal behavioural standards, common ideas o� violence, and an urge to negotiate settlements to conflict were part and parcel o� interactions between individuals and with the �orces o� state authorit� in earl� modern Europe
67
. In their views, the interaction o� institution and neighbourhood -'�rom above' and '�rom below' -is the driver o� ideas and practices o� social control. As Mantecón states, "popular spheres, social �orces, and customar� institutions never ceded their right to arbitrate disputes. Increasingl�, the� arbitrated ever�da� disputes b� using local courts as the arena �or discussion" 68 . Social discipline emerged �rom the goals and interactions o� all members o� societ� ; petitions constitute a process b� which those social goals are defined, elaborated and acted upon in legal settings.
The role o� petitions across Europe as a tool used both b� rulers, to in�orm themselves o� and act upon the a��airs o� their subjects, and b� those subjects, to find avenues �or dispute resolution that precluded the necessities o� violence and censured certain degrees o� social behaviour, deserve �urther investigation in �ull� scale. This article has shown that in Farnese Parma, the control o� violence cannot be seen as the result o� one side or another's victor� in the battle �or social control. Rather, as the state attempted to expand its real control over the hearts and purses o� subjects, individuals pursued those options which were, or seemed, most use�ul. Here the two perspectives on the decline o� violence can come together. The evolution o� legal s�stems provided the opportunit� �or the displacement o� violence and personal conflict to abstract s�stems o� threat and coercion. This is seen vividl� in the pre�erence o� Parman soldiers �or firearms displa� rather than gun violence ; in both the interactions that predicated a judicial process and in the judicial process 67 Mantecón (2006, p. 268) ; Schwerho�� (2006, p. 236) .
68 Mantecón (2006, p. 284). themselves, violence was diverted �rom ph�sical action to theatrical posturing. People retained the mental structures that encouraged competition and aggression, but the institutional structure in which these emotions were pla�ed out promoted the channelling o� this competition into non�violent arenas, such as displa�s o� status, and the resolution o� conflict in the tribunal s�stem.
The s�stem had its weaknesses, o� course. Those with personal and pro�essional connections to high levels o� government obviousl� had better access to and success at the ducal court, as Barbara Preti's case vividl� demonstrates. Additionall�, it is important to recall that ever� success�ul petition that emerged �rom a court process dealing with a violent crime le�t a victim, or indeed, a double�victim : not onl� did the petitioner commit violence against his victim, the state then abetted this victimization b� choosing rehabilitation over retribution. This could not satis�� ever�one. Further, we must recall that petitions had a fiscal component as well. Each success�ul petition was taxed according to a rubric, and man� petitioners �ound themselves in the position o� having to appeal these costs as well. In terms o� o�ficial corruption, cron�ism and nepotism do not seem to be behind most ordinar� petitions, but other archival deposits ma� prove otherwise. These petitions instead provide clear glimpses o� the active choices made b� Parmans o� an alternative to personal violence in solving their social conflicts. As seen above, this rejection o� violence was visible in the petitions o� both men and women who did not have the resources, material or social, to pursue the �eud and vendetta that characterises much o� the violence noted b� historians in medieval and earl� modern Europe 69 . 
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